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Abstract: China’s economic growth undoubtedly led to an increase in the 
standard of living. Nevertheless, the price that China paid for this remarkably 
fast growth since its opening up in 1978 cannot be neglected. Due to a 
restructuring of the economic growth model, inequality occurred to a certain 
extent and has been strengthened by Chinese institutional features. The current 
growth model is considered as unsustainable and prone to external shocks – 
whereat it could not rely on the household consumption. The latter is 
extremely low by international standards, wherefore several factors are held 
responsible. The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of income and other 
Chinese characteristics that are claimed to be responsible for negatively 
affecting the household consumption. By using a comprehensive survey from 
2011, these effects are measured directly at the household level. Having an 
understanding of the magnitude of these effects, especially about the 
importance of household income, certain solutions are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
China’s low household consumption is already a hot topic in the economic related media. 
Concerns are not only raised by western media, but also by Chinese politicians. At the 18th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, the former president Hu 
Jintao announced plans to let the domestic consumption become a main pillar of the economy 
(IDCPC, 2012). At present, the main contributors to the gross domestic product (GDP) are 
investments and export. The economic crisis in 2008 showed that China’s economic growth 
was highly sensitive through the decreasing demand for Chinese exports from its trade partners 
(Jain, 2014). Only by political measurements, such as a huge economic stimulus package used 
for investments could the economic downward trend be stopped. Even though these measures 
were efficient in terms of maintaining high GDP growth rates during the economic crisis, it 
seemed like China woke up and became aware of its high dependency on others country’s 
economic situation (Morrison, 2014). Even though in 2013 China’s domestic household 
consumer market belonged to one of the biggest in the world in absolute numbers (Economist, 
2013), its contribution of 34.1 per cent to the GDP is one of the lowest in international 
comparison (The World Bank, 2015a). Although the household consumption is growing on a 
strong level of 8 percent per year; its contribution to the GDP is still low (Dorrucci et al., 2013).  
 
Given the growing concern about low domestic consumption, the aim of this thesis is to identify 
factors that affect the household consumption in China and measure their effects in an 
econometric approach. Based on the results, a discussion shall explain what the findings may 
imply for the further development of China and the role of household consumption as a 
contributor to the GDP. This thesis considers only private household consumption in its 
investigation and excludes government consumption. The following definition is applicable: 
“Household final consumption expenditure (formerly private consumption) is the market value 
of all goods and services, including durable products (such as cars, washing machines, and 
home computers), purchased by households. It excludes purchases of dwellings but includes 
imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes payments and fees to governments 
to obtain permits and licenses” (The World Bank, 2015a). 
 
The aim of this paper is operationalised in the following research question that will lead to the 
econometric analysis:  
What role does a higher household income play for a higher household consumption? 
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The contribution of this paper to the previous research is to measure the effect of income and 
other factors on the consumption on a household level. This will be realised with the help of a 
very recent and thorough household survey that was conducted in 2011. The existing literature 
so far considers these factors mainly on a macro level, but no literature was found that covered 
the entire spectrum of household expenditures. Before the situation in China is investigated on 
a household level, the issue at hand is analysed in a broader picture, giving an overview of the 
Chinese growth model and explaining the need of a rebalance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: The previous research will break down the issue from a 
broader perspective and explain the development of the Chinese growth model since the 
opening up in 1978. The next chapter of the previous research shows the threats of the current 
growth model and why it is not sustainable. Afterwards, suggested reasons for the low 
household consumption are stated. Based on these suggestions, the ones that affect a household 
are explained in detail, the income in particular. 
 
In a next step, hypotheses are derived from the previous findings. The following methodology 
part introduces the econometric approach that is applied in this paper. Afterwards, after a 
presentation of the results, a discussion will investigate the findings and their effects in detail. 
The paper ends with a conclusion that revisits the research question. 
2. Previous research  
 
2.1 How the Chinese growth model developed 
Without any doubt, the economic growth of China has been rapid since its opening up in 1978. 
Even though China’s growth model helped millions of people out of poverty and increased 
China’s importance in the world economy, its negative side effects cannot be neglected. The 
growth model is often considered as not being sustainable and being too reliant on export and 
investments financed by the government. The practise of an economic policy that focused on 
short term growth in the recent past caused a lot of social and economic imbalances (Dorrucci 
et al., 2013).  
 
Due to the socialist development strategy China has pursued after the nation was founded in 
1949, household consumption was not in the focus of the government; especially in rural areas, 
where household consumption was remarkably low. From 1952 until China’s opening in 1978, 
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the per capita consumption in rural areas only grew by 58 percent, whereas the urban 
consumption grew by more than 200 percent (Naughton, 2007: 80). 
 
After the implementation of the reforms in 1978, and a political re-orientation towards a more 
open and industrialised economy, many investments were made by the government to set up 
the infrastructure and enable rural residents to move to urban areas to work. By bringing more 
people into urban areas and providing work, consumption was always on a very high level. In 
absolute terms it strongly increased from the opening-up of China, but in relative terms it has 
always been crowded out by investments, due to high impact of the government on the 
economic landscape. (Hubbard et al., 2012) This paper refers to the expenditure approach of 
composing the GDP, which is the sum of government consumption, household consumption, 
investment and net exports of goods and services (Lardy, 2006).  
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the GDP, broken down into the expenditure categories. It 
is noticeable that for the first decade after the reforms, until the Tiananmen incident in 1989, 
the GDP composition was mainly based on household consumption with a share of around 50 
percent for this period and the fastest growing component of all. This was possible due to 
increased prices of agricultural products the government paid for, and the resulting increase in 
income of the peasants. There was also an increase of income in urban areas which contributed 
to the overall high household consumption (Dorrucci et al., 2013). 
 
The strong economic growth of the post-reform period was mainly due to a factor reallocation 
from the rather agricultural rural areas with abundant labour force, towards the industrial urban 
areas (Wang, 1999). However it was not only this change of location and the economic sector 
that was a significant reason for the economic growth, but also a movement of labour from 
SOEs towards non-SOEs. This reconstruction of the SOEs led to a massive lay-off of employees 
and consequently caused a noticeable decrease in the domestic consumption share due to an 
increase in unemployment. In addition, SOEs lost their responsibility to cover the education 
and social security expenditures of their employees (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). This led to an 
increase in household savings up from China’s opening in 1978. Whereas the household saving 
rate was about 6 to 7 percent of the GDP at this point of time, it increased to 22 percent in 2007 
(Yang et al., 2011). The high savings rate provided capital for the government for investment. 
Making use of a high saving rate for government investment to generate economic growth in a 
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so called “Keynesian-style” is insufficient without generating incentives to consume on the 
other hand (Wang and Gang, 2009). 
 
Figure 1: Development of GDP composition  
 
Source: NBS, 2014 
After the Tiananmen incident, the government was forced to take action to cool down the 
economy and lowered its investments. This was the time when the income growth slowed down 
and affected the consumption share. An expected decrease of the GDP did not take place though, 
since the government consumption increased on the one hand, but even more important, the net 
export was boosted by the help of a gradual currency devaluation (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). 
 
The period from Deng Xiaopings southern tour in 1992, in which he set the basis for a 
systematic change towards a market economy, until China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, was 
mainly characterised by a strong increase of government investments to set up the environment 
for an economic reorientation and a stronger export. This development lasted for about 3 years, 
until the government decided to revaluate the currency in order to keep the inflation rate low. 
After entering the WTO, the importance of the foreign trade for the GDP grew even more. 
Exports and fixed investment became the main driver for economic growth from 2001 onwards, 
which led to very high and steady economic growth figures (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). As figure 1 
shows, a drop in the export share due to the global financial crisis since 2007 has been 
countervailed by government investments. 
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2.2 Why the growth model should be rebalanced 
As stated in the introduction, the Chinese government became aware of the threats of its growth 
model. The following chapter gives an understanding of the lack of sustainability of the current 
model. According to e.g. Lardy (2006), Wang and Gang (2009) and Dollar (2013), amongst 
others, sustainable growth can only be reached by an increase in the share of domestic 
consumption. 
 
To reach such a sustainable growth level with China’s current model, it is argued that the 
domestic consumption must at least grow with the same pace as the overall economy, what has 
not been the case for China since 2000. The minimum level for household consumption in China 
which is required to achieve a sustainable model swings at around 45 percent GDP (Wang and 
Gang, 2009). In 2013, the household consumption share accounted for 36 percent (NBS, 2014). 
Hence, China is at the very end of this ranking amongst developing economies (Fukumoto and 
Muto, 2011). A comparison with other economies - western and Asian - shows that the Chinese 
household consumption is remarkably low. For example, the United States of America (USA) 
or the United Kingdom (UK) as well as Asian economies like Japan and South Korea currently 
have significant higher consumption shares, between 71 and 67 percent, and 55 and 48 percent, 
respectively (McKinsey, 2009). 
 
Many issues about the current growth model are discussed in the literature, and most of them 
can be explained by the economic development from the 1990s onwards, where two major 
issues appeared: the high share of fixed investment, and export (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). First of 
all, the high share of exports that contributes to the GDP implies a high dependency on the 
economic situation of its trade partners. To maintain high growth rates like the current ones in 
China, the export has to grow constantly on a high level as well. On average, the customer 
countries show growth rates around 2 to 3 percent per annum which might turn into a threat in 
the long run, especially in times of a recession. A decrease in exports has a multiplier effect on 
a country’s GDP and this effect is getting more severe with a higher export share in the GDP. 
More threats are likely to appear in the long run. They are mainly based on political disparities 
between China and its trading partners, but also on the imbalance between the exported and 
imported goods. Whereas China mainly exports manufactured goods, its import of raw 
materials is not negligible (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). Besides potential political issues, the high 
dependency on the absorption of Chinese goods by its trading partners might turn out to be the 
most severe. In order to maintain high growth, Chinese companies have to produce and sell 
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more. Since the domestic market is not absorbing these goods, the dependency on export 
markets is getting stronger and the need for higher domestic consumption even more necessary 
(Wang and Gang, 2009). 
 
The high contribution of fixed investments by the government to the GDP growth comes along 
with significant risks, even though high investment shares are typical for developing countries 
and are especially profitable in strong growth periods (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). Meanwhile, 
China’s investments are facing the problem of low efficiency. Based on a calculation, the GDP 
share of fixed investments would ideally be around 30 percent at a GDP growth of about 10 
percent. Yet, China’s fixed investment share swings around 40 percent of GDP and does not 
pay off in a required way. Since these high investments are mainly made to maintain a high 
GDP rate and thereby suppress the consumption share, an economic break down is a possible 
result (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). In addition, a vicious circle emerged through this heavily 
investment-based growth structure. Most of the investments that have been made were directly 
flowing into the capital-intensive secondary sector, which is not as efficient as the tertiary sector 
in terms of generating jobs (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). As incentives were given to expand 
the secondary sector, the third sector lags behind in its development and consequently the 
employment growth. As a result of an underrepresented service sector, the employment growth 
is negatively affected and consequently the wage level, including the purchasing power, as well. 
Since it can be considered as a natural development that people shift towards the service sector 
and consequently employment and wages increase, China’s development seems to be different 
(Dorrucci et al., 2013).This development becomes even clearer considering the facts presented 
by Dorrucci et al. (2013). Whereas China’s GDP grew about 10 percent per annum on average, 
the employment growth was just about 1 percent between 2001 and 2010. A comparison with 
a selection of developed and developing countries, amongst them some Asian like South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia and Japan, show that China’s average GDP growth is differing 
significantly from the pattern that other economies show, having an uncommonly low 
employment growth.  
 
The development that China has experienced so far came along with the emergence of many 
disparities and imbalances. The still remaining dominance of the SOEs in certain industries is 
a result of the strong influence of the CCP on the economic landscape. SOEs are thereby used 
as instruments for fixed government investments. Whereas SOEs are favoured also in terms of 
access to the heavily state controlled credit market, the small and medium sized private 
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enterprises (SMEs) especially suffer from a hindered access to financing, which ultimately 
leads to restricted growth for the SMEs, since profits have to be used for investments instead 
of paying higher wages, dividends, etc.  (Dorrucci et al., 2013; Aziz and Cui, 2007). This effect 
ultimately results in the hindrance of having to create more jobs for private SMEs (Wang and 
Gang, 2009) 
 
The foregoing chapter showed that China’s export and investment-focused way of development 
came with many issues. To receive a more sustainable and robust growth, higher reliance on 
the household consumption seems unavoidable. In the following chapter, suggestions by 
researchers shall be presented how to achieve this transformation. 
 
2.3 What causes the imbalance? 
In order to pinpoint factors that cause the imbalance, or restrict the household consumption 
respectively, researchers looked into various fields. These factors range from the household 
registrations system (hukou), the dominance of the state owned enterprises, the repressive 
financial system and the incentive and reward system for local politicians (Dollar, 2013),  to 
rather fiscal policy based ones, including tax reduction and exchange rate deregulation (Lardy, 
2006). Even though the reduction of income taxes might be a common practice to stimulate 
consumption, there is not much scope to reduce the income tax. A tax reduction in 2004 has not 
led to a significant increase in the household consumption. Increasing the government 
consumption, especially on health, education, welfare and pensions, is expected to have a much 
stronger effect (Lardy, 2006). An increase in government expenditures is seen as a way to 
stimulate household consumption. This Keynesian assumption has been proven in a case 
presented by Wang and Gang (2009). In terms of expenditures, the USA in the 1930s 
exemplifies that the implementation of a social security system, labour standards and income 
taxes led to a reduction in income inequality and ultimately in an increase in household 
consumption (Wang and Gang, 2009). A further example is Taiwan, where in 1998 almost the 
entire population became covered by national health insurance and household consumption 
increased (Lardy, 2006). 
 
Based on a calculation of the McKinsey Global Institute, the household consumption share 
could increase up to 50 per cent by 2025 by realising political measures: firstly by enabling of 
consumer spending, by for example granting easier access to credit or availability of products 
all over the country; Secondly, by improving the social security net which would lead to a relief 
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of expenditures on medical treatment and pensions. Ultimately, a rebalance of investment and 
income would take place (McKinsey, 2009). 
 
Some researchers assume that the household consumption will reach a more sustainable level 
the moment the income per capita advances to a middle-income level as it has been the case 
with other Asian economies. They are optimistic and believe that the disposable household 
income will automatically increase and hence lead to higher consumption when the abundant 
supply of labour force is reduced, even without political intervention (Hubbard et al., 2012; Zhu 
and Kotz, 2011). The case of Japan in the 1970s showed that reaching this point, the so-called 
Lewis turning point, ultimately led to an increase in wages (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). 
 
China has still a lot of potential to grow and generate jobs. Due to high domestic savings in 
total and comparatively low government debts of 50 per cent of the GDP, the Chinese 
government would be able to generate jobs by investments in the short run, and consequently, 
generate consumption. Seeing this as an opportunity, the high investment share of the GDP 
would be a legitimate option to increase household consumption (Lin, 2015).    
 
Some opinions exist that impute the strong growth of household consumption to the 
urbanisation that took place so far (Hubbard et al., 2012; Dorrucci et al., 2013). However, 
Fukumoto and Muto (2011) see the urbanisation process as failed, since the household 
registration system (hukou), which is also considered as one of the main reasons for the low 
domestic consumption by Dollar (2013), comes along with significant restrictions for rural 
residents. Rural residents are highly de-incentivised as they will not become a part of the urban 
social security, education and health care system if they relocate. To tie in with the comparison 
of Japan’s situation in the late 1970s, the Japanese government had been actively promoting the 
urbanisation and was providing financial incentives to move to urban areas, which ultimately 
resulted in a boosted household consumption. In China, urban residents are privileged in terms 
of social security compared to their rural counterparts, even though in 2007 the coverage of 
pension insurance (34 percent), medical care insurance (30 percent) and unemployment 
insurance (40 percent) is remarkably low. Since rural residents do not benefit from these 
systems in the same way, a higher saving rate is the consequence (Wang and Gang, 2009). 
 
With regard to the high share of investments, Japan faced a similar challenge in the 1970s, 
having a mainly investment driven economy. By an increase in labour wages, its growth 
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structure turned into a more balanced one. Even though the initial conditions differ, it can be 
said that China is now at the same economic development level as Japan was at that point of 
time. In Japan, the catching up period with the technologically higher developed countries led 
to high return on investment rates and after catching up, the returns were diminishing. Since 
lower return on investment rates hindered the attractiveness of investments, the investment 
share of the GDP decreased with the development of the economy. Another factor that has 
affected the attractiveness of government investments was a reformation of the banking system 
in the late 1970s. Japan turned away from a regulated lending policy towards a more liberalised 
system. Consequently, the cost for capital increased and reduced the incentive for investment 
(Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). As already stated above, the investments in China already turned 
out to be inefficient, hence this is not necessarily leading to a decrease in investments in China. 
However, a reformation of the banking system is generally feasible. 
 
To underline the advantage of an increased household consumption for the economy, the 
multiplier effect, or theory respectively, by Keynes can be applied. It describes the consecutive 
effect that money spent by consumers has on the economic cycle - namely the fact that a higher 
demand for goods leads to an increase in employment at the supplier side, which benefits from 
higher profits and more capital to pay wages that can be used for consumption. The multiplier 
effect is not only applicable for household consumption though, but also for government 
consumption, investments and also exports. An important factor for the multiplier effect is the 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC), which means the share of additional income that is 
used for consumption. Consequently, the reciprocal would be the share that is saved. The effect 
of the multiplier can be calculated by: 1/(1-MPC), which means that if half of the additional 
income is used for consumption, the multiplier is two. This means that twice the amount spent 
will lead to generation of goods and services (Mankiw and Taylor, 2011: 709-711). 
 
2.4 How did the pinpointed factors develop in China 
The foregoing chapter showed a variety of factors that are commonly suggested to change in 
order to obtain an increase of the household consumption. Some of them seem to be dominant 
in affecting the household consumption directly; namely income, location and the social 
security system, including education. Keeping the research question in mind, the factor of 
income shall be specifically investigated further in the following, but the other factors will be 
mentioned also. Based on the following analysis, the hypotheses shall be derived. 
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2.4.1 Income 
Based on China’s economic growth, it is surprising that China is still struggling with its 
domestic consumption and showing an opposing trend between economic growth and 
household consumption. This indicates that this economic success story has not been spread 
across the entire society (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011; Aziz and Cui, 2007).  
 
The following figure demonstrates the development of the GDP in comparison to the household 
consumption. This supports the fact that this development drifted apart from each other. 
 
Figure 2: GDP vs household consumption 
 
Source: NBS, 2014 
 
It is assumed that the household consumption will increase the moment the income per capita 
reaches the middle-income level (Hubbard et al., 2012; Zhu and Kotz, 2011). By definition of 
the World Bank, this would be the case at a per capita income between $1.045 and $12.746 
(Gross National Income Atlas Method), whereas there is a threshold between lower and upper 
middle-income countries at $4.125. (World Bank, 2014). Keeping everything else constant, this 
should be easily proved by the development of other economies; taking Japan, South Korea and 
Hong Kong as a benchmark - as these are often used as benchmarks for comparisons by e.g. the 
McKinsey (2009), Dollar (2013) or Dorrucci et al. (2012). It becomes clear, that household 
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consumption is not clearly correlated to the income level and that China reached the lower 
middle-income level in 2001, and the upper middle-income level in 2010. 
 
The following figure shows a comparison between the disposable income and the share of the 
household consumption in the respective economy.  
Figure 3: GNI per capita vs GDP share of household consumption 
 
Source: World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2015c 
 
Having in mind that the gross national income has been increasing steadily over time, and 
recalling Keynes (1936: 66) that the consumption grows with increasing income - even though 
not to the same extent as income growth - the question at hand is whether the increase in income 
is received by the households in every income group or whether inequality in income 
distribution is present. This can be part of the puzzle of why household consumption is not 
increasing in accordance with the income per capita. 
 
The economic restructuring in the 1990s led to a massive lay-off of former SOE-workers 
(Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). This period contributed to an increase in income inequality. Even 
though income inequality might be good for an economy to set incentives for the lower income 
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groups to ascend towards a higher income group, it is a thin line between incentivizing and 
discrimination (Wong and Yu, 2002).  
 
According to the findings of the survey that is used for this paper, 57 per cent of the national 
income in 2010 had been earned by just the upper 10 percent (Economist, 2012). Other official 
numbers look less intimidating, even though they still seem to be comparatively high. The 
World Bank for example specifies the income share held by the upper 10 percent with 30 
percent for the same point of time (World Bank, 2015b). However, as the figure below shows, 
almost half of the income is held by the upper 20 percent of the society. This share has been 
growing over time and hence inequality became a more and more apparent phenomenon in 
China.  
 
Considering that such a high share of income is held by such a small group and recalling that 
the propensity to save increases with a higher income, inequality is getting even stronger under 
these circumstances. This significant amount of accumulated savings could have been used for 
consumption in a more equally distributed income society (Wang and Gang, 2009). The effect 
of savings is strengthened by the overall strong saving mentality of Chinese people not only 
due to the lack of social security, but also for prestige reasons and future purchasing. Limited 
access to consumer credits force people to save to realise unusual purchases like household 
durables (Kraay, 2000). However, the main reason for high savings is most likely in order to 
create financial reserves for social security, health and education as described in the following. 
Figure 4: Income distribution in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2015b 
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The income disparities between rural and urban people are also an apparent phenomenon. 
According to the NBS, the net income of rural residents was 6,977 RMB, compared to 23,979 
RMB of urban residents in 2011. Even though the real growth rate is 3 percentage points higher 
for rural residents with 11.4 percent compared to 8.4 percent, the gap is still significant. The 
income gap consequently decreased from 3.23:1 in 2010 down to 3.13:1 in 2011 (NBS, 2012). 
However, poverty in rural areas was substantially decreased - in 1988 about 67 per cent of the 
rural residents were living under the poverty line of 1.25$ per day, whereas in 2007 only 3 per 
cent remained in poverty (Zhang et al., 2012). 
2.4.2 Urbanisation 
The previous chapter indicated that urbanisation is a crucial factor for consumption growth. The 
Chinese hukou-system constitutes a significant constraint for further urbanisation and, hence, 
income equality between urban and rural areas. The hukou separates Chinese citizen into rural 
and urban residents. With this separation, different rights and privileges come along. As a rural 
citizen, only a few options to receive an urban hukou exist, e.g. by marrying or studying. Even 
though rural residents without an urban hukou do not have the right to enjoy urban education, 
employment and social welfare (including medical services, pension insurance and housing 
security), the population in urban areas has increased by 560 million people to 730 million 
between 1978 and 2013. Despite the fact that this represents an urbanisation rate of 53.7 per 
cent, only 36 per cent of the Chinese own an urban hukou. The difference can be explained by 
rural migrants who moved to urban areas and accept restricted access to the above mentioned 
urban privileges (Wang et al., 2015). Since this limitation of urbanisation is often described as 
a factor that limits China’s development towards sustainable growth, the Chinese government 
just recently released a strategy plan on how to improve urbanisation by 2020 (Wang et al., 
2015).  
2.4.3 Social security system 
The social security system in China does not cover the entire population. In urban areas only 
half of the people have health insurance, vs. one fifth in rural areas. The government spending 
on social security totalled only 3.5 per cent of the GDP in 2005 (Lardy, 2006). 
 
The restructuring in the 1990s also brought a change in the social security system. A 
governmental cut in health care support transferred the burden of these payments from the state 
to the employees and employers, which ultimately led to an increase in income inequality 
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(Wong and Yu, 2002). The share of health expenditures that have been covered on the own 
expenses of Chinese people increased to 55 per cent in 2003, compared to 20 per cent after the 
opening up in 1978 (Lardy, 2006). Social security has since been provided by the work unit that 
a worker belongs to and consequently, the quality of social security varied. This also contributed 
to inequality in social security, since the resources of an urban work unit were most likely higher 
than a small, rural, agricultural work unit. The bigger SOEs were especially able to provide far-
reaching social security, like retirement payrolls. After China’s transformation and growing 
privatisation, these benefits disappeared in many cases, and local funds tried to compensate this, 
which were paid by the employers and employees. The lay-offs led to a strong migration of 
workers to urban areas, where they did not obtain the local (urban) social security due to their 
rural hukou (Watson, 2012).  
 
Unemployment insurance in 2005 covered only 14 per cent of the working population. In case 
of an accident at work, the number of workers who would be covered by a workers’ 
compensation is even lower, with 11 per cent, hence high savings are a consequence (Lardy, 
2006). 
 
In times of retirement, the current pension model is only covering a negligible share of the 
population; in 2005, only 17 per cent of the workers had the right to receive a pension. 
Receiving a basic pension is unlikely to provide sufficient support, since it will only pay 20 per 
cent of the average local wages (Lardy, 2006). 
 
Education is an important factor in helping rural areas reach the upper middle-income class 
(Zhang et al., 2012). Nevertheless, education expenditures by the government were steadily 
decreasing and consequently taken over by the households as a stronger financial strain (Wong 
and Yu, 2002). However, compulsory education has at least been made free everywhere in 
China since 2007; and poor families are supported by the government with books etc., which 
led to an enrollment rate of 99.5 percent for primary school and 98.5 for secondary school (Zhou, 
2013). 
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3. Hypotheses 
 
Based on the situation that has been described in the previous chapter, the following hypotheses 
shall shed some light on the impact of these factors on household consumption. Recalling the 
research question, the effect of income on the household consumption will be the main 
independent variable. Other variables are included to either test or control for them or to put the 
difference in income groups into relation. 
 
The first hypothesis addresses the effect of household income on household consumption, since 
the differing development of economic growth and household consumption raises the question 
of inequality across the society. The following hypothesis shall clarify whether the effect of 
income is stronger on the poorer society since their financial resources to cover all the 
expenditures are more limited. The first hypothesis is called:  
H1: The impact of household income on the household expenditures decreases for 
higher income households. 
 
Based on the introduced issue of a rural-urban-disparity, it will be interesting to measure how 
this circumstance effects household consumption. Hypothesis two aims at investigating whether 
pushing forward the urbanisation in combination with an increase in income will lead to a 
higher household consumption. Therefore, the second hypothesis is called: 
H2: The effect of living in a rural area on the household expenditure is stronger with 
poorer income groups. 
 
Since higher education seems to be a valuable good in China and hence the access to it is closely 
tied to the income situation of a family, it might be interesting to know whether higher 
government expenditure on education and hence a higher level of education across the society 
would be a reasonable investment.  
H3: Government expenditures on education will pay off. 
 
The weak social security system that is claimed in many cases to be insufficient and unfair in 
China, is according to the previous literature held responsible to some extent for high saving 
rates and consequently low domestic consumption. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how 
strongly it actually effects the household consumption.  
H4: Relying on a social security system has a positive effect on household consumption. 
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4. Methodology 
 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the effect of income on the consumption behaviour of the 
Chinese on a household level. Previous research shows that other factors besides income are 
held responsible for holding back the household consumption as well. 
These factors can be roughly categorised as income, location, education and social security 
system. The following approach shall test for these effects in the best possible way, by making 
use of a survey that has been conducted within 8,438 households across China. Some answers 
can be chosen as good proxies to address the effect of the above mentioned factors. 
Other socio-economic factors will also be included as control variables like age and sex, as 
done by e.g. Zhang et al. (2012) in the case of China, or Heshmati and Rudolf (2014) in the 
case of South Korea.  
The following regressions therefore intend to investigate these assumptions and show the 
magnitude of its effects.  
 
4.1 Methodology  
The method that is used in this work to test the hypothesis is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
This econometric method will allow the analysis of so-called independent variables on one 
dependent variable. The variables for this analysis will be described in the following. 
 
The relationship between dependent and independent variables can be explained by a linear 
function:  
 
𝑌 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽10𝑥10𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
4.2 Dataset 
The dataset used for this analysis is the “China Household Finance Survey” (CHFS). The CHFS 
is provided by the Survey and Research Center of China Household Finance, Southwestern 
University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China. The dataset is the result of a survey 
that has been conducted in 2011. It contains answers on demographic characteristics, assets and 
debts, insurance and social welfare and income and expenditure affairs of 8,438 Chinese 
households, represented by 29,463 individuals. The sample claims to be representative of 
China’s geographic characteristics by covering 80 counties from 25 provinces in China. The 
final selection in the rural areas has been made randomly, where 20 households have been 
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picked. In the urban areas, 140 households have been selected for interviews - based on a 
distribution of the housing prices in the regarding area -, whereas the wealthier households were 
more strongly represented than the poorer ones (chfsdata.org, 2015). 
 
It is a cross sectional dataset that contains the answers of numerous different observations at a 
certain point of time. A cross sectional dataset allows the investigation of different aspects, in 
this case it is the household financial situation of the survey participants in 2011.  
 
The entire dataset consists of two parts. Part one is the questions that have been answered on 
an aggregated household level, e.g. the location, distance to the city centre, household income 
and expenditures. Part two consists of individual responds on the questions like gender, age, 
level of education, having a job, retirement payment, social health insurance and unemployment 
insurance. The two datasets have been merged based on their household identification number, 
which means that the aggregated household related data appears for every household member.  
To avoid errors due to differing statements within one household, only the household head has 
been taken into consideration. 
 
4.3 The econometric model 
To test for the aforementioned hypotheses, an econometric model has been constructed to use 
it for an OLS regression. 
 
Based on the literature and findings by other researchers, the model contains corresponding 
variables that serve as a proxy for the influences on the household consumption. Since the 
research question aims to analyse the effect of income on household consumption, the 
econometric model uses expenditures of the household as the dependent variable. More details 
about the expenditures will follow further down. The main independent variable will be the 
household income of the family to measure the linear relationship between these two variables, 
or in other words the impact of income on the consumption behaviour. Other independent 
variables will be further described and justified later. The model looks as follows: 
𝑌(ln)𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
=  𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ (ln)𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑙_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7
∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 ∗ ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑎_𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽11 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒²𝑖 +  𝛽12 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑜𝑓_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
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4.3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable “household expenditures” represents the aggregated expenditures of a 
household for an entire year. It contains various groups of expenditures, namely: meals; water, 
electricity, fuel, etc.; daily necessities (household items); housing services; local transportation; 
communication; entertainment; clothes; housing, decoration, maintenance, etc.; heating; 
household durables; luxury goods; education and training; conveyance; traveling; health care; 
medical expenses. These variables are all expenditure related variables in the dataset. This 
aggregation is in accordance with the definition of household consumption by the World Bank, 
mentioned in the introduction. Since on a macro level all these categories appear on an 
aggregated level, consequently this dataset provides an appropriate reflection of the overall 
expenditure situation of households in China.  
 
Since a logged dependent variable is used, an elasticity between the income, education, etc. 
levels will be shown.  
4.3.2 Independent variables 
The data for the household income is provided by the dataset as an imputed annual household 
income. Unfortunately, there is no further information available about how this is composed. 
Since it could have been expected that there exists a positive linear relationship between income 
and consumption, a recent categorisation by McKinsey of disposable household income into 
poor/lower income (less than 60.000 RMB/year), lower middle-income (60.000 – 106.000 
RMB/year), upper middle-income (106.000 – 229.000 RMB/year) and affluent (more than 
229.000 RMB) seemed to be more appropriate and informative (McKinsey, 2013). This 
definition is basically in accordance with the NBS, whereas the upper boarder of middle income 
is defined by 500.000 RMB/year (Wang, 2010). The McKinsey classification has been 
preferred as the NBS classification would lead to a very small group of affluent people. 
 
The second test variable is the rural vs. urban variable. Since the difference in income and 
social security seems to have a significant impact on the living conditions in both areas, this 
impact shall be measured by using this variable. The location is also directly linked to the access 
to markets. A variable indicating the distance to the city centre in minutes shall explain the 
effect of the accessibility of goods on household consumption.  
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The access to education has been described as unequal and one of the key concerns of families 
to save money and hence negatively affect consumption. Testing the impact of the educational 
background of individuals on the consumption of their household will give an indication of 
whether the support of education pays off for the government, as higher education might lead 
to more wealth and consequently higher consumption. Besides education, the social security 
system is considered as one of the main constraints for households to consume, as precautious 
savings might limit consumption. A question from the survey that asks for the most important 
form of safety net for a household shall give indication about the amplitude of various options 
on household consumption. The effect of enjoying social health insurance is supposed to give 
further indication about the necessity to implement a comprehensive social security system in 
order to boost household consumption. 
 
To receive a higher explanatory power of the model, four variables have been added to control 
for: the question whether an individual has a job, its gender, the age and the number of 
household members. There are reasons to assume that the development of the saving and 
consumption behaviour is not a linear development over the lifetime of an individual. As the so 
called life-cycle hypothesis suggests, the development of saving is supposed to reach a peak 
during the working life of an individual and decreases afterwards (Jappelli and Modigliani, 
2003). Therefore the age variable is taken as a squared function into the regression, expecting 
that the consumption behaviour takes an opposed development.  
 
The inclusion of these variables seemed to be the best possible fit to combine the previous 
research and the answers that could be taken from the survey at hand. Since most of the 
variables are used as categorical variables, their regression output will be in comparison to a 
reference category. The according reference categories are as follows: 
 
Table 1: Reference categories 
Variable Reference category 
Urban vs. Rural Rural households 
Educational background Never attended school 
Most important form of safety net Savings 
Social health insurance Having a social health insurance 
Job Having a job 
Gender Male 
 
To gain the maximum explanatory power of the model, only the answers of household heads 
have been taken into consideration. Also the legal age has been considered for the model, 
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Observations
Mean / 
Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
household expenditure 4634 32847.17 41944.45 216 876344
household income 4634 48961.52 115183.1 6.33 3000000
affluent 90 567745.7 588966.8 230000 3000000
upper middle-class 253 144473.8 31605.93 106000 227500
lower middle-class 634 78470.86 13147.11 60000 105880.4
poor 3657 24470.37 16179.92 6.33 59948.29
rural 2690 58.05
urban 1944 41.95
distance to city centre 4634 42.81 41.34 0 660
no school education 389 8.39
primary school 1,259 27.17
junior high 1,568 33.84
high school 694 14.98
secondary/vocational school 206 4.45
college 269 5.8
undergraduate 232 5.01
master 17 0.37
savings 756 16.31
child support 1,709 36.88
social welfare 889 19.18
retirement pay 1,079 23.28
commercial insurance 23 0.5
spouse or relative 31 0.67
other 147 3.17
having a social health insurance 4,293 92.64
no social health insurance 341 7.36
having a job 3631 78.36
no job 1003 21.64
male 3,594 77.56
female 1,040 22.44
age 4634 56.03 10.59 41 93
age2 4634 3252.06 1260.12 1681 8649
familymembers 4634 3.51 1.58 1 18
consequently household heads under 21 have been excluded. Survey answers that were not 
showing any information were excluded, hence the number of observations shrank from 
originally 8,438 households to 4,634. This cut in observations did not affect the proportions of 
the respective income groups.  
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
The following descriptive statistics show the aggregated values for all income classes, except 
for the household income. Since this is the main variable, it is listed in detail. More detailed 
descriptive statistics for the respective income groups can be found in the appendix.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression 
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4.4.4 Testing  
To get control over the impact of outliers, the dependent expenditure and the independent 
income variable are defined as a log-value. By logging the continuous variable, the results 
cannot be seen as a change in absolute units, but rather in an elastic way. 
 
Also a test with robust standard errors has been conducted, but did not show any difference. 
However, due to the nature of the dataset - which contains observations from various social 
classes with different behaviours - heteroskedasticity still exists but has been considered as not 
having a strong impact on the results. There is no sign of multicollinearity for the model, a test 
can be found in the appendix. 
 
4.4.5 Limitations 
Assumptions had to be made due to quality issues of the dataset. For example the household 
income is only described as household income, leaving it open whether it is the disposable 
income or total income before paying taxes. Despite this, these assumptions have been made to 
the best of my knowledge and belief.  
 
A further limitation is the fact that the only geographical distinction can be made on the basis 
of urban and rural observations. It can be assumed that there exist also disparities in income 
and expenditures between the coastal areas and the hinterland. Even though the regarding 
questions for the provinces exist in the survey, the data has been included defectively in the 
dataset.  
 
It can also be considered as a limitation that only actual expenditures are taken into 
consideration. There cannot be any conclusion taken from the dataset about whether certain 
income groups, etc. would like to consume more. It merely represents a snap-shot of the current 
expenditure situation.  
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Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
(ln) household income 0.2657*** 0.0112 0.0812 0.1060 0.3748* 0.1980 0.4992*** 0.1641 0.1984*** 0.0145
urban 0.3266*** 0.0375 0.4148 0.2518 0.0432 0.1309 0.4137*** 0.0912 0.3107*** 0.0437
distance to city centre -0.0009*** 0.0003 0.0011 0.0033 0.0010 0.0016 -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0008** 0.0003
primary school 0.1759*** 0.0464 0.2313 0.2774 0.2982* 0.1681 0.1753*** 0.0498
high school 0.3024*** 0.0545 -0.1994 0.2961 0.0287 0.2838 0.4820*** 0.1688 0.2991*** 0.0605
college 0.4070*** 0.0701 -0.0655 0.2918 0.0836 0.2997 0.5776*** 0.1804 0.3415*** 0.0894
undergraduate 0.5535*** 0.0735 0.0868 0.2858 0.3706 0.2987 0.4770*** 0.1782 0.4944*** 0.1073
master 1.0212*** 0.1969 0.7395* 0.3931 0.6503* 0.3825 0.3606 0.3450 2.6963*** 0.8057
child support -0.0638* 0.0345 -0.5921** 0.2904 -0.2209 0.1534 0.0433 0.1018 -0.0497 0.0384
social welfare 0.0985** 0.0414 -0.4471** 0.1983 0.1961 0.1392 0.0169 0.1024 0.1269*** 0.0484
retirement pay 0.1114** 0.0475 -0.4445** 0.2057 0.1545 0.1500 0.0262 0.1093 0.1662*** 0.0576
no social health insurance -0.0131 0.0441 0.1058 0.2896 -0.3355** 0.1490 0.0789 0.1310 -0.0057 0.0497
no job 0.2692*** 0.0424 0.6611** 0.3456 0.3524** 0.1482 0.0660 0.0939 0.3313*** 0.0510
female -0.0297 0.0292 0.2411 0.1739 -0.0742 0.0993 0.0013 0.0668 -0.0432 0.0342
age -0.0665*** 0.0105 0.1149 0.1186 -0.0957** 0.0370 -0.0578** 0.0248 -0.0621*** 0.0122
age2 0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0011 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0001
familymembers 0.1006*** 0.0080 0.1303** 0.0589 0.0203 0.0320 0.0747*** 0.0205 0.1075*** 0.0091
_cons 8.8745*** 0.3281 7.2814** 3.3713 9.5033*** 2.5605 5.7467*** 1.9936 9.3703*** 0.3812
Obs.:
Adj. R-squared
Dependent variable: (ln) household expenditure; (***) 1% Level, (**) 5% Level, (*) 10% Level
0.29580.3911
90
0.2922
253
0.1961
634
0.1282
All Affluent Upper middle-class Lower middle-class Poor
4634 3657
Table 3: Regression results 
5. Results 
 
The results below are shown for all income groups together on the left side and also for every 
income group separately. Some categories that will not be explicitly discussed later on have 
been left out in the presentation, for example the effect of having visited vocational school on 
income.  
 
Due to the nature of the variables, the majority of the independent variables appear as 
categorical variables; hence, the results have to be interpreted in relation to the previously 
mentioned reference categories. The output of the OLS regression looks as follows: 
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The regression output originated interesting findings that will be described first, and then 
discussed in the next chapter. The adjusted r-squared value of 0.39 for the overall model 
provides sufficient explanatory power to interpret its coefficients, but also the individual 
income group regression outputs show satisfying adjusted r-squared values.  
 
It is the primary intention to measure the effect of household income on household expenditures. 
The results show that there is a positive effect of a household’s income on its expenditures. 
Considering all income groups from my sample, while holding all things equal, 1 percent 
increase in income would lead to 0.26 percent increase in expenditures. Having a closer look 
on the respective income groups, this effect is the strongest on the lower middle-class, where 1 
percent increase in income leads to 0.4992 percent increase in consumption. At the lower end 
of the income groups, this effect decreases since 1 percent income increase only leads to 0.1984 
percent increase in expenditures. Towards the upper income groups, the effect decreases as well. 
Even though the results for the affluent group are not statistically significant, the tendency can 
be assumed to be right. Consequently, hypothesis one cannot be validated since the impact of 
income on expenditures is increasing first and then decreasing. This finding will be discussed 
later on. 
 
To test for hypothesis two, a look on the coefficient for the urban localised households is 
necessary. For the all-including model, this effect is statistically significant and needs to be 
interpreted by the following formula: 
△𝑦= 100 × (𝑒
?̂?×𝛥𝑋 − 1) 
 
Whereas △ 𝑋 is the change in units (1) and ?̂? the coefficient shown in the result table. Applying 
this formula, household expenditures are about 38.6 per cent higher in urban households 
compared to rural households. The statistical significant results from the poor and lower middle-
income group are already sufficient to refuse hypothesis two, since the effect of living in an 
urban area on the expenditures is higher in a lower middle-income household than in a poor 
household. In addition, the inclusion of the distance variable shows that the factor of distance 
to a city centre and hence market can be almost neglected and that the urban-rural-disparity is 
not based on aggravated access to goods. 
 
Even though many results are not statistically significant for testing hypothesis three, tendencies 
are recognisable. Particularly, the all-including model gives sufficient information to prove the 
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assumption that a higher educational background of the household head is positively related to 
a household’s expenditure. Consequently, based on the statistical significant results, hypothesis 
three can be confirmed for the model at hand. Since there is no observation in the affluent group 
that has never attended school, the reference category is primary school. 
 
The importance of a supportive social security systems is shown by the results of the all-
including model. Households that rely on social welfare, or retirement pay respectively, are 
consuming more than households that rely on their savings. However, having a closer look on 
the different income groups, these tendencies vary, which is why hypothesis four cannot be 
validated. Taking the social health insurance into consideration is not supportive, since the 
results are only statistically significant for the upper middle-class and hence no conclusion can 
be drawn from it. 
 
Even though they are not the main investigated objects, the included control variables deliver 
interesting results as well. Most significant is the effect of age, which shows that except for the 
affluent income class, people tend to consume less first with an increasing age and at some 
point this phenomenon turns around and the consumption increases.  
 
The different findings will be part of the discussion in the next chapter. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The results deliver clear and interesting indications of how strongly the household consumption 
is effected by the previously identified factors. The following chapter shall discuss them 
through the lens of the research question. It shall be analysed how these factors can be utilised 
by the government to realise an increase of this important GDP component by taking over parts 
of the investment share.  
 
As the results show the significant impact of income on household consumption, there are two 
main questions that need to be clarified. First of all, since the statistics and the regression 
underline the issue of inequality in China, a closer look at that issue is necessary. Secondly, to 
lift the findings back onto the bigger picture where the research question emerged from: would 
an increase in household income automatically lead to a higher household consumption?
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While keeping in mind that the dataset claims to be representative for the Chinese household 
situation, the descriptive statistics show that by definition the majority of households belong to 
the poor household income group, followed by the lower middle class. The official definition 
of income groups can be considered as slightly problematic, since not only does the income 
vary between urban and rural areas, but so does the cost of living (Wang, 2010). However, as 
for example shown in the case of Chongqing, the urban-rural-income and urban-rural-
consumption ratios are the same, hence the effect of income on household consumption is the 
same for both areas (Zhu and Jin, 2011).  
 
Testing for hypothesis one showed that the effect of household income on household 
expenditure is the strongest for the lower middle-income group. Except for the affluent income 
group, all results are statistically significant and hence reliable for a discussion. The 
comparatively low effect for the poor group is not too surprising. A high tendency to save 
money is based on uncertainty. As determined in the foregoing chapters, a non-comprehensive 
social security network and high costs for education and health care force especially poorer 
people to save more. This effect is strengthened by a generally strong saving mentality of 
Chinese people. The positive effect of relying on social welfare or a retirement pay in 
comparison to savings can be considered as an indicator that poorer people are especially 
dependent on a social security system. The assumption that the social security net is important 
for poor people but unimportant for affluent households is supported by the finding that relying 
on social welfare or retirement pay has a negative effect compared to savings for affluent 
households. The savings of the affluent class are most likely contributing more to the 
expenditures than social security could do.  
 
The combination of statistics and results reveal that due to the comparatively big size of the 
poor class, an increase in income would unleash a massive group of potential consumers. This 
is proven by the strong effect of income on consumption of the lower middle class compared to 
the poor group. Referring this finding in relation to research question, the role of a higher 
household income is extremely significant on the domestic consumption in absolute terms. 
 
Having determined that the biggest differences exist between the poor households and lower 
middle-income households, the question at hand is how to increase the income level and let the 
poor benefit from it in order to rise up to the middle-income class. 
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First of all, job creation has to take place in order to provide more people with income. The 
limited access to financial resources for companies will play an essential role, since the private 
companies - which are more efficient in creating jobs - have only limited access to capital and 
consequently limited growth opportunities (Aziz and Cui, 2007). Not only would companies 
benefit from a more liberalised capital market, but further investment opportunities for private 
investors would also contribute to a higher household consumption. The current situation shows 
that compared to OECD-members, the household income is mainly based on wages and less on 
profits from investment (Aziz and Cui, 2007). A more market-driven capital market will most 
likely lead to a relaxation of credit access for private consumers as well and hence a higher 
consumption, or lower saving rate respectively (Kraay, 2000). In 2010, 18 provinces in China 
planned to raise the minimum income about 20 per cent and employees in the production sector 
were intended to double their income within five years (Yang et al., 2011). The effects of these 
plans remain to be seen. 
 
China’s abundant labour is considered as one factor for low wages. The Lewis turning point, 
which describes the point when the surplus of labour in an economy is exhausted, has not been 
reached yet in China and is expected to occur between 2020 and 2025, depending on the 
demographic development (Das and N’Diaye, 2013). In the case of Japan, reaching this point 
in the 1970s played an essential role for the increase of income and ultimately to an increase in 
consumption (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). Jobs are most likely to grow in service industries 
(Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). By putting the focus on the growth of the tertiary sector, a decrease 
in the capital-intense service sector can be a positive side effect, since these investments are not 
efficient and crowding-out the consumption share. 
 
The regression output gives information about the effect of a household’s location on its 
consumption. As it could have been expected based on the previous information, the urban 
population consumes more than the rural. The strongest and statistically significant magnitude 
for the expenditure gap between urban and rural can be found for the lower middle-class. This 
could be mainly explained by the help of statistics. Whereas two thirds of the poor people live 
in rural areas, two thirds of the middle-income class live in urban areas. Consequently, realising 
further economic growth combined with a well-planned urbanisation could unleash a massive 
potential of consuming households. The urbanisation rate is still low by international standards, 
which leaves a lot of potential. By taking the result that shows the effect of the distance to a 
city centre, the factor of remoteness of rural areas can be considered as not important and 
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differences between urban and rural residents are most likely based on lower income. 
Urbanisation will be controlled by the government, which means that for a successful realisation 
of a higher urbanisation rate, investments are unavoidable (Dorrucci et al., 2013).  
 
As briefly mentioned, the interpretation of the social security net results show a higher 
dependency on governmental support for the poorer income group. An improved nationwide 
social security system would therefore contribute to higher household consumption on the one 
hand, and on the other hand it would reduce the amount of cautious savings which could be set 
free for more consumption. Also inequality could be reduced by a lower need to save income 
(Yang et al., 2011). The current social welfare system only benefits people who have paid into 
local funds, or have been employed respectively (Watson, 2012). The same applies for a 
standardised and nationwide pension system. As long as retirees are dependent on the retirement 
payroll of their previous employees, inequality will exist amongst the older generation (Watson, 
2012). By 2020, the government aims to completely cover the poor society with social welfare, 
including health care, education and housing (Jain, 2014). First steps are initiated – in rural 
areas, a minimum living allowance system and a cooperative medical service system was set 
up in 2006 (Wang and Gang, 2009). The regression hypothesises that further measures are most 
likely to boost household consumption. Even though the statistical significance for the social 
health insurance is not given, except for the upper middle-class, its tendency still gives 
indications. The value for the upper middle-class reveals that people with a health insurance 
spend about 40 per cent more than their non-insured counterpart. It is questionable whether 
such a strong difference can be simply explained by the higher cautious savings of the non-
insured group. However, it gives an indication that providing this part of a social security net 
has a positive impact on the household consumption as well. 
 
The education system that can be considered as a component of the social security system in a 
broader sense represents an important factor to increasing household consumption as well. One 
of the main issues with education is the high costs, whereof the government only covers the 
compulsory level (Zhou, 2013; Wang and Gang, 2009). A commercialised education system 
resulted in high costs and hence exclusion of the poorer society (Zhu and Kotz, 2011). As the 
results show, a higher degree of education is strongly positively connected to the household 
consumption. The same counts for education as for e.g. the pension or social welfare. The fewer 
savings which have to be made accessible to these “institutions”, the more income can be used 
for consumption. Consequently, the government might benefit from higher spending on 
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education in the long run, since a higher average level of education might contribute to a higher 
level of quality for economic growth.  
 
The control variables prove effects that could have been expected, like a positive effect of 
having a job or increasing expenditures with an increase in household members. Surprisingly, 
no statistical significant effects for the role of the gender could be found. This might be due to 
a strong underrepresentation of women amongst the household heads. For the statistical 
significant income groups, the assumptions based on the findings of Jappelli and Modigliani 
(2003) could be proved, stating that the expenditure behaviour will increase after a downward 
trend for a certain amount of years. 
 
Even though the results provide a clear picture of how strong the effects of addressing the 
mentioned issues in an effective way will be, China still faces the issue of an investment driven 
growth model. Different to Japan, where an increase of costs for capital led to a decrease in 
investments, China’s investment is mainly undertaken by the government and due to the 
dominance of state owned banks, the cost of capital will not necessarily lead to lower 
investments (Fukumoto and Muto, 2011). It is rather the willingness of the government to invest 
less that will ultimately lead to a lower investment share. The previous results show that a 
decrease in investments could be compensated by household consumption, in case the right 
measures are addressed and the government spending increased. 
7. Conclusion 
 
In order to answer the research question, a higher household income plays a significant role for 
a higher household consumption. All the factors above are worth a paper on their own. However, 
this paper intended to show their interaction and tried to convey a better understanding of the 
magnitude of the most important factors that constrain household consumption. 
 
The comparison of the GDP vs. household consumption and the GNI vs. household 
consumption over time with other economies give reason to believe that China is different in 
its economic growth structure. Even though the foregoing work shows that income has a very 
strong impact on a household’s consumption, especially in the lower income groups, there are 
other factors significant for the consumption as well. The strong influence of the government 
on the economic structure of China can be actively used to minimise these inequalities by 
spending more and investing less, hence rebalancing the shares of the economy. It might just 
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be a matter of time until the Chinese government risks to decrease its investments and let the 
consumption take over. Factors that will help to set the course have been analysed. 
 
It will be difficult on the one hand to increase household income by generating a higher income 
level and relieve households from their burden of paying for education, health etc. and on the 
other hand to rely less on investment to maintain economic growth at the same time. Rather, it 
can be expected to be a gradual transition from one to the other. Taking away this burden from 
the households possibly causes a double-effect. Firstly, it will lead to a decrease in the saving 
rate which hence frees up capital to consume, and secondly it will provide the government with 
less capital that could be used for inefficient investments.  
 
If the government does not properly address income inequality and the other factors, the current 
development will most likely continue as a vicious circle. As Bislimi (2013) states, if an 
economy consumes too much, it has a deficit in available capital to invest. Reaching this phase 
seems to be far away for China.  
 
In conclusion, it is not the case that Chinese households do not consume at all. The investment 
based growth strategy by the government has been responsible for crowding out the household 
consumption share. The results show that there is reason to believe that an increase in income 
might lead to a replacement of the high dependency on investment by household consumption. 
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Appendix 
 
Detailed statistics 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the affluent income group as used for the regression 
 
  
affluent Observations
Mean / 
Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
household expenditure 90 104186.5 68191.55 7582 443719
household income 90 567745.7 588966.8 230000 3000000
rural 25 27.78
urban 65 72.22
distance to city centre 90 21.98889 24.97617 0 100
no school education
primary school 8 8.89
junior high 14 15.56
high school 10 11.11
secondary/vocational school 4 4.44
college 19 21.11
undergraduate 30 33.33
master 5 5.56
savings 23 25.56
child support 14 15.56
social welfare 20 22.22
retirement pay 29 32.22
commercial insurance 2 2.22
spouse or relative 1 1.11
other 1 1.11
having a social health insurance 84 93.33
no social health insurance 6 6.67
having a job 80 88.89
no job 10 11.11
male 70 77.78
female 20 22.22
age 90 50.43333 8.350537 41 72
age2 90 2612.478 906.3462 1681 5184
familymembers 90 3.544444 1.375231 1 9
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the upper middle-class income group as used for the regression 
 
  
upper middle-class Observations
Mean / 
Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
household expenditure 253 70775.22 72194.87 5737 876344
household income 253 144473.8 31605.93 106000 227500
rural 66 26.09
urban 187 73.91
distance to city centre 253 30.75889 26.15751 0 120
no school education 7 2.77
primary school 25 9.88
junior high 61 24.11
high school 48 18.97
secondary/vocational school 20 7.91
college 44 17.39
undergraduate 42 16.6
master 6 2.37
savings 36 14.23
child support 38 15.02
social welfare 74 29.25
retirement pay 99 39.13
commercial insurance 1 0.4
spouse or relative 5 1.98
other
having a social health insurance 232 91.7
no social health insurance 21 8.3
having a job 188 74.31
no job 65 25.69
male 187 73.91
female 66 26.09
age 253 53.8498 10.20276 41 93
age2 253 3003.486 1217.299 1681 8649
familymembers 253 3.541502 1.43761 1 13
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the lower middle-class income group as used for the regression 
 
  
lower middle-class Observations
Mean / 
Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
household expenditure 634 47701.08 39084.36 1680 422040
household income 634 78470.86 13147.11 60000 105880.4
rural 213 33.6
urban 421 66.4
distance to city centre 634 32.38486 31.68641 0 300
no school education 20 3.15
primary school 84 13.25
junior high 197 31.07
high school 116 18.3
secondary/vocational school 55 8.68
college 74 11.67
undergraduate 83 13.09
master 5 0.79
savings 73 11.51
child support 131 20.66
social welfare 164 25.87
retirement pay 257 40.54
commercial insurance 2 0.32
spouse or relative 3 0.47
other 4 0.63
having a social health insurance 606 95.58
no social health insurance 28 4.42
having a job 418 65.93
no job 216 34.07
male 477 75.24
female 157 24.76
age 634 56.3959 11.26092 41 91
age2 634 3307.106 1360.249 1681 8281
familymembers 634 3.640379 1.522867 1 12
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the poor income group as used for the regression 
 
  
poor Observations
Mean / 
Percent Std. Dev. Min. Max.
household expenditure 3657 25892.37 34366.66 216 695654
household income 3657 24470.37 16179.92 6.339996 59948.29
rural 2386 65.24
urban 1271 34.76
distance to city centre 3657 45.96855 43.36988 0 660
no school education 362 9.9
primary school 1,142 31.23
junior high 1,296 35.44
high school 520 14.22
secondary/vocational school 127 3.47
college 132 3.61
undergraduate 77 2.11
master 1 0.03
savings 624 41.73
child support 1,526 17.06
social welfare 631 17.25
retirement pay 694 18.98
commercial insurance 18 0.49
spouse or relative 27 0.74
other 137 3.75
having a social health insurance 3,371 92.18
no social health insurance 286 7.82
having a job 2945 80.53
no job 712 19.47
male 2,860 78.21
female 797 21.79
age 3657 56.2595 10.50498 41 93
age2 3657 3275.456 1246.739 1681 8649
familymembers 3657 3.493027 1.61317 1 18
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Variable VIF 1/VIF
(ln) household income 1.38 0.727143
urban 2.62 0.381348
distance to city centre 1.15 0.871347
primary school 3.27 0.306271
junior high 3.94 0.25363
high school 2.9 0.34532
secondary/vocational 1.74 0.575499
college 2.06 0.485074
undergraduate 1.97 0.507557
master 1.09 0.921108
child support 2.12 0.47148
social welfare 2.04 0.491332
retirement pay 3.08 0.324319
commercial insurance 1.03 0.968707
spouse or relative 1.04 0.960148
other 1.17 0.855497
no social health insurance 1.02 0.983988
no job 2.33 0.428811
female 1.13 0.881481
age 95.25 0.010499
age2 95.84 0.010434
familymembers 1.22 0.817735
Table 8: VIF-Test for the all-including model  
